

AIR POUCH

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Chief, SE

Attn: [

Senior Representative, [

17 December 1952

ACTION-SE//

BGFIEND/Operational
Recapitulation, BGFIEND Operations, 1 January 1952 to 31
December 1952

A. Agent Operations

1. Infiltrates:

a. Overland

Willow	5 men
Apple	5 men
Throttler	2 men
Fig	5 men

b. Air Drops

Apple	1 man
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c. Total Agents Infiltrated: 18

2. Infiltrations:

Willow - 1st trip	4 men
2nd trip	5 men
3rd trip	5 men

Apple	6 men
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Throttler- 1st trip	2 men
2nd trip	2 men
3rd trip	2 men

Fig	5 men
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Total Infiltrations 31

3. Casualties:

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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- 2 -

3. Casualties:

a. Killed - 0

b. Captured - 0

4. Agents Unaccounted for: 0

5. Exfiltrates:

Willow - 5 men

Apple - 3 men

Throttler - 2 men

Fig - 5 men

Pine (1951) 4 men

Total Agents Exfiltrated: 19

6. Aborted Operations:

Cedar (2 man team)

Obsession (2 man team)

7. Agents Presently Operative:

Apple - 3 men

8. Agents on Hand for 1953 Operations:

P/M Agents 15

W/T Agents 10

Total 25

B. Air Operations

1. Resupply Drops

Apple - 8 May 1 bundle dropped, 1 received

6 Jul 5 bundles dropped, 0 received

4 Aug 9 bundles dropped, 5 received

6 Sep 4 bundles dropped, 2 received

Totals 19 bundles dropped, 8 received

2. Leaflet Drops

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- 3 -

2. Leaflet Drops

x	21 Jan	156,000 leaflets	57,000 Shqiperia
x	27 Feb	150,000 "	5,000 "
	3 Mar	100,000 "	50,000 "
	30 Mar	40,000 "	
*	8 May	118,000 "	175,000 "
*	6 Jul	500,000 "	54,000 "
	28 Jul	547,000 "	150,000 "
*	4 Aug	227,000 "	5,000 "
**	2 Sep	107,000 "	
	5 Sep	241,000 "	
*	6 Sep	250,000 "	
	10 Oct	<u>500,000</u> "	

Totals:

2,936,000 leaflets	496,000 Shqiperia
	<u>2,936,000</u>

Grand Total:

3,432,000

3. Propaganda Supply Drops

21 Jan	900 cans	250	1 lb. bags flour
27 Feb	<u>1470</u> "	<u>250</u>	1 lb. " "
Totals	2370 cans	500	1 lb. bags flour

4. Dummy Drop

2 Sep

5. Total Number Covert Air Missions: 12

x Combined with propaganda supply
* Cover for supply mission
** Combined with dummy drop

C. Communications

1. Apple Tree Team (As of 15 December)

53 contacts comprising:

93 in messages totaling	4680	word groups
54 out messages totaling	<u>1972</u>	word groups

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2. Throttler Team

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- 4 -

2. Throttler Team

19 contacts comprising:

33 in messages totaling	2041	word groups
8 out messages totaling	290	word groups
	<u>2331</u>	

3. Fig Tree Team

12 contacts comprising:

12 in messages totaling	490	word groups
6 out messages totaling	89	word groups
	<u>579</u>	

4. Total Contacts: 84

5. Total in messages: 138

6. Total out messages: 68

7. Total word groups: 9562

D. VALUABLE Operations

1. Agent Operations

Scrutiny	- 4 men
Satisfaction	- 4 men
Sambo	- 4 men
Saluki	- <u>4</u> men

Total 16 men

2. Leaflet Missions

1 May	500,000 leaflets
24 Jun	500,000 "
26 Aug	Quantity unknown
9 Nov	500,000 leaflets

E. Conclusions

1. The results of our 1951 operations, recorded in 986-CAGWU, dictated a thorough review of our operational procedures and techniques. As a result of this review, the following measures were adopted in the planning for 1952 operations in an effort to improve our record:

a. The emphasis in

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a. The emphasis in our agent recruitment was placed on quality rather than quantity. 18 volunteers of higher mental calibre and motivation were selected for training and infiltration during 1952, as opposed to 39 agents of mediocre to poor quality in 1951.

b. Unlike 1951, no volunteers were selected from the Albanian Guard Company nor was the Military Junta of the N.C.F.A. asked to recommend potential agents. Our decision not to utilize these sources of personnel was based on our experience with Albanians we took into our confidence in the past. They succeeded in violating every security precaution we instructed them to observe.

c. The N.C.F.A. and its Military Junta were completely divorced from all operations and were given no operational information.

d. No blind parachute drops were made during the 1952 season. All team infiltrations were made overland. Personnel and supply air drops were only made to reception committees at pre-arranged D/Z's. Had the necessary maritime support facilities been available, sea infiltration and exfiltration would also have been used in some cases.

e. No agents were permitted to remain in the Athens area during periods when they were not on missions. During these periods of inactivity, agents were placed in towns on the Peloponnesus or in Northern Attica. The Greek Services and the local gendarmerie were notified of their presence in these towns and kept them under surveillance.

f. We recognized the necessity for a faster method of dispatching resupply containers from our covert aircraft. The release of containers from the aircraft in a few seconds time is impossible, however, when each cumbersome container must be manhandled through the door by two dispatchers. To date, this problem remains unsolved.

2. The overall results of the agent operations conducted during 1952 seem to justify our adoption of the above measures. A solution to the problem in f. above should permit us to substantially improve our effectiveness during 1953.

3. The BGFIEND island training site scheduled for completion in April of 1953 will be of incalculable value to us in the conduct of future operations. The site's location is ideal from the standpoint of security. Its proximity to Athens will permit close coordination between training and operations staffs which will be advantageous in tailoring the school's curriculum to most effectively meet operational requirements.

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